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Muslim minoriti�s throughout Europe are under 
threat of collateral damage from the Blair/Bush 'War on 
Terror.' In Scotland they also have to cope with the 
added possibility that Scottish nationalism might devel­
op an 'ethnic' as well as a 'civic' dimension. But is 
Scottish nationalism part of the problem or part of the 
solution? Paradoxically, Muslims are under less pres­
sure in Scotland than in England, despite Scotland's 
move over recent decades-psychologically as well as 
institutionally-towards nationalism. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the connections between 
lslamophobia and sub-state nationalism within Britain. Muslim 
minorities in Britain and throughout Europe are now under threat 
of collateral damage from the Blair/Bush 'War on Terror.' But 
within Scotland, traditional Scottish self-consciousness, the long 
debate over devolution, rising nationalism and the eventual cre­
ation of a Scottish Parliament (inaugurated in 1999) all pose a 
potentially additional challenge to Scotland's Muslims. 
In England there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that 
racial and cultural minorities identify with (inclusive) 'Britain' 
rather than (exclusive) 'England.' Ethnic minorities within 
England are notably reluctant to describe themselves as 'English' 
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rather than 'British,' their modal preference being 'equally British 
and ethnic-group'-implying, it is claimed, that 'Britishness' is 
'inclusive.' And conversely there is evidence to suggest that 
English nationalists-those members of the white majority in 
England who describe themselves as 'English, not British'-are 
particularly antagonistic towards racial and cultural minorities. If 
race, culture, and identity were linked together in a similar way 
within Scotland, we might expect that the position of any racial­
ly and culturally distinctive minority might have been under­
mined by the growth of Scottish nationalism-even without the 
added shock of Sept 11th. 
Paradoxically our research shows that in almost every par­
ticular the opposite is the case. It shows that Muslims in Scotland 
identify with Scotland rather than the supposedly more 'inclu­
sive' Britain; that the Blair/Bush 'War on Terror' has committed 
Muslims far more strongly to Scotland than ever before; that 
despite (or perhaps because of) the growth of Scottish national 
identity and the advent of a separate Scottish Parliament, 
lslamophobia is significantly lower in Scotland than in England; 
that although lslamophobia is clearly tied to English nationalism 
within England, it is almost uncorrelated with Scottish national­
ism within Scotland. 
This may imply that English nationalism is more 'ethnic' 
while Scottish nationalism is more self-consciously 'civic.' But 
Scottish nationalism does have an impact on phobias within 
Scotland, though on Anglophobia far more than on 
lslamophobia. The tendency of Scots to define themselves nega­
tively as 'not-English' may provide some shelter for other 'non­
English' groups within Scotland. Scottish Muslims gain some 
advantage from being a 'double-minority' - a minority within a 
minority. 
But the relative weakness of all anti-minority ethnic phobias 
in Scotland also reflects the consistently multi-cultural strategy of 
Scottish political elites--critically including the independence­
oriented leadership of the SNP (Scottish National Party) as well 
as the merely devolution-oriented Labour and Liberal-Democrat 
elites. The Scottish public is not so naturally multi-culturalist as 
these elites. But Scottish elites work harder to moderate public 
prejudice than do English elites. So at the elite level there is a 
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coalition of Muslims and Scottish Nationalists, which has been 
strengthened by a common antagonism towards Blair and his 
international policies. That elite coalition does not reach down to 
the street, but it has sufficient influence on the street to control 
and moderate the street-level antipathy between Muslims and 
nationalists-of the kind that exists within England. 
Minorities in Scotland and England 
The largest racially and culturally distinctive minority in 
Scotland consists of ethnic Pakistanis. But the numbers of 'visi­
ble' ethnic minorities in Scotland are low. According to the 2001 
Census ethnic Pakistanis (almost all of them Muslim) constitute 
less than one percent of the population. And altogether the 2001 
Census shows that Muslims as-a-whole constitute just over one 
percent in Scotland. 
Nonetheless Pakistani Muslims in Scotland are 'visible' -
unlike for example the very much larger English minority 
(defined by birth) in Scotland. And the Muslim Pakistanis are par­
ticularly visible because they are concentrated in the Glasgow 
area of west-central Scotland where one of them represents the 
Govan constituency in the British Parliament. 
In England 'visible' ethnic minorities are more numerous 
and Carribeans, Africans, Indians, and others constitute a larger 
share. According to the 2001 Census there are just over one per­
cent Pakistanis but slightly over three percent Muslim in England. 
Aga(n the Asian minority are more visible than their numbers 
might suggest because they are concentrated in particular indus­
trial areas of the North and Midlands of England. 
Scottish Muslims feel Scotland is a relatively safe-haven 
As part of a wider survey of minorities in post-Devolution 
Scotland we carried out six focus-group discussions with (self­
described) 'ethnic Pakistanis' in late 2002 followed by 759 tele­
phone interviews with ethnic Pakistanis in 2003. Using a multi­
lingual research team we were able to encourage both focus­
group participants and survey respondents to use English, Urdu 
or Punjabi (or any mixture of these languages) as they preferred. 
In the focus-group discussions we asked participants specifically 
about Sept 11th and its impact on their lives in the intervening 
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year. Sept 11th had been as traumatic for Muslims as for 
Americans, and a year later their memories of the time were still 
sharp. 
There was shock, disbelief and some shame: 'shock ... horri-
fied ... numbness'[PK4-EJ; 'unbelievable'[PK6-GJ; 'ashamed that 
Muslims could be involved in this crime'[PKS-BJ, 'it upset me 
that my faith was being used'[PK4-EJ. But there was also some 
resentment: 'They seem to associate terrorism only with Muslim 
countries' [PK2-AJ; 'Look at what is happening in Ireland, 
Belfast'[PK2-BJ; 'If someone is going to carry out an act of ter­
rorism, they don't need to be a Musi im ... there are al I sorts of 
factions around the world representing different ideologies' [PK4-
EJ. And fear. Fear of an anti-Muslim backlash: 'My mum and dad 
said don't walk outside the house with a headscarf ... someone 
will shoot you or something, kill you on the street... It was 
scary ... very scary' [PK1 -GJ. But also fear of terrorists: 'Terrorism 
can happen anywhere'[PK4-DJ; 'We saw Pan Am crashing in 
Scotland' [PK4-E]. 
British people had become 'more unfriendly' towards 
Pakistanis and Muslims: 'It has made a difference ... people look 
at us with suspicion'[PK4-DJ; 'I heard of many physical attacks 
made against Muslims ... my husband warned me not to go to the 
Mosque after Sept 11th' [PKS-EJ; 'I blame the media' [PK6-FJ. 
But amongst participants in our Scottish Muslim focus groups 
direct personal experience of greater anti-Muslim attitudes in the 
aftermath of Sept 11th was limited in scope and intensity: 'Not 
really directly but people can be cold, you can detect the anti­
Muslim feeling'[PKS-A]; 'Some people may say that we are imag­
ining anti-Muslim feeling, but we are not; we can feel it'[PK4-EJ; 
'racist looks'[PK2-BJ; 'cold stares ... worse in the early days after 
the attacks'[PK2-AJ; 'I have been called Osama Bin Laden a cou­
ple of times'[PK3-EJ. 
There was some disagreement about whether Scots in par­
ticular (as distinct from other Britons) had become more 
unfriendly towards Pakistanis and Muslims after Sept 11th: 'I 
don't think there have been any great differences between 
Scotland and England' [PK3-DJ; 'It affected everybody rn 
Scotland and in England'[PK3-EJ. 
But most thought the problem had not been so bad in 
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Scotland as in England: 'I don't think there were too many prob­
lems in Scotland'[PKS-G]; 'It was only natural to have some 
problem here but it could have been much worse' [PKS-A]. There 
was: 'more trouble in England' [PK4-A]; 'a lot of trouble in 
England' [PK2-D]; 'a lot more racism in England'[PK1-E]; 'more 
organised groups in England which cause trouble against ethnic 
minorities'[PK1-C]; 'The National Front party [now called the 
BNP British National Party] has always been very popular in 
England' [PK2-A]. 
A few felt nowhere was safe in the aftermath of Sept 11th: 
'After Sept 11th no place in the world felt safe' [PKS-E]; 'If this 
horrible thing had happened in Britain, I really don't know how 
people would react here ... no place is really safe'[PK2-C]. But 
for a variety of reasons, including both fear of anti-Muslim reac­
tions and fear of terrorism, most were glad to be living in 
· Scotland rather than in England or anywhere else. To them 
Scotland for all its faults seemed to be a relatively safe-haven in 
a very dangerous post-9/i 1 world: 'I was glad to be living in 
Scotland'[PK6-G]; 'much safer in Scotland'[PK6-D]; 'Scotland 
was a more comforting place to be than any other part of 
Britain'[PK2-B]; 'most safe in Scotland ... if we were in Pakistan or 
America, we might have been accused and attacked' [PK3-C]; 
'Living in France would be bad at the time and Holland would 
be quite bad as well. .. I wouldn't like to be in America at the 
time'[PK1-C]; 'It is safer being in Scotland than in Pakistan'[PKS­
D]; 'Even when the IRA were bombing, they never came to 
Scotland. It was always Manchester or London that got 
attacked' [PK6-C]. It is quite a I ist. It seemed safer to be in 
Scotland than in England, Europe, America - or Pakistan. 
At the outset we hypothesised that Scottish self-conscious­
ness, the long debate over devolution, and the eventual creation 
of a Scottish Parliament after the 1997 Referendum could have 
posed an added challenge to Muslims in Scotland. So in the 
focus-group discussions we asked participants to compare the 
impact of Scottish nationalism, culminating in the creation of a 
Scottish Parliament with the impact of Sept 11th on Scottish atti­
tudes towards Muslims. Both could have encouraged anti­
Muslim feelings. 
The response of focus-group participants was unequivocal -
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not only was the Scottish Parliament less of a problem, it was in 
their view part of the solution. Some even found our question 
shocking: 'You cannot compare Sept 11th and the Scottish 
Parliament in the same way [expressed in shocked 
manner]'[PKS-D with agreement from rest of group]; 'Sept 11th 
was a lot worse ... and I do not think the Scottish Parliament has 
been a negative thing'[PK1-D]; 'The only person [adversely] 
affected by the making of the Scottish Parliament is Tony [Blair]. 
Every ethnic minority is fine [i.e. happy] with the Parliament in 
Scotland'[PK2-B]; 'There was a peace statement made in the 
[Glasgow] City Chambers from all the faiths wanting to work 
together and overcome the difficulties. The will is there [in 
Scotland] to improve things'[PK4-E]. 
The only criticisms directed at the Scottish Parliament con­
cerned its lack of power, authority, influence, or effectiveness: 'I 
am glad to be in Scotland, but there is a question about what the 
Scottish Parliament can do'[PK1-D]; 'Foreign policy is dealt with 
by [British] Central Government; the Scottish Parliament has got 
nothing to do with it'[PK6-E]. 
The attitudes expressed in these focus-group discussions 
were corroborated by our large sample survey. We asked Scottish 
Pakistanis about their perceptions of conflict between Muslims 
and non-Muslims-in Scotland, in England, and 'across the 
world'. Although considerable numbers of Scottish Pakistanis (39 
percent) do rate conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
Scotland as at least 'fairly serious,' almost twice as many Scottish 
Pakistanis (77 percent) believe such conflict is 'fairly serious' 
south of the border in England. And 93 percent of them believe 
such conflict is 'fairly serious' around the world. 
At far lower levels, there is an even more striking variation 
in Scottish Pakistanis' perceptions of 'very serious' conflict. Only 
six percent think conflict with non-Muslims in Scotland as 'very 
serious.' But 32 percent believe it to be 'very serious' in England, 
and 68 percent feel it is 'very serious around the world' . They 
may be wrong of course, but looking out from their Scottish van­
tage-point, Scottish Muslims see Scotland as a relatively (if only 
relatively) safe-haven. 
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A coalition of Muslims and (Scottish) Nationalists? 
The Muslim perception of Scotland as a relatively safe haven 
is at least plausible. Scottish political elites, both devolutionists 
and the more independence-minded nationalists, have consis­
tently proclaimed a non-ethnic, inclusive, 'civic' concept of 
nationalism. With the possible exception of the Conservatives all 
significant political elites represented in the Scottish Parliament 
have taken an unambiguous and self-consciously multicultural­
ist position. 
In particular the 'First Minister' [head of government] in the 
Scottish Parliament, Labour's Jack McConnell, has declared that 
Scotland needs more immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic 
minorities. On the opposition side, the SNP (Scottish National 
Party) leader John Swinney has accused Labour of 'racism' in its 
ill-treatment of Muslim asylum seekers, repeatedly describing it 
as a 'national shame' or a 'national disgrace'-despite the fact that 
a large majority of Scots favour detaining asylum-seekers. For the 
SNP this is a courageously and in narrow short-term party-polit­
ical terms costly position. 
Conversely Muslim Pakistanis readily identify with Scotland 
while asserting their own culture and traditions and paying scant 
regard to traditional Scottish culture. Their Scotland, like the 
SNP's, is 'Scotland Future' not 'Scotland Past.' 
In our survey of ethnic Pakistanis in Scotland we asked them 
to place themselves on the standard 5-point Moreno identity 
scale that runs from exclusively Scottish to exclusively British. 
Very few refused. But when faced with this forced choice 
between British and sub-British identities, Pakistanis in 
Scotland-unlike their counterparts in England-reject British 
identity. Even amongst those Pakistanis now living in Scotland 
who were born outside Scotland, three times as many describe 
themselves as 'mainly or exclusively' Scottish as opt for 'mainly 
or exclusively' British. 
Of course, that is partly because their primary identity is 
'Muslim' rather than any territorial identity-be that Scottish, 
British or Pakistani. Nonetheless insofar as ethnic Pakistanis in 
Scotland have a territorial identity (and they do, even if it is sec­
ondary) it is overwhelmingly 'Scottish' . 
And this is matched by their constitutional and party prefer-
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ences. They now support Scottish independence far more than 
average Scot. And in terms of voting Pakistanis in Scotland swung 
decisively towards the SNP (Scottish National Party) at the 2003 
Scottish Parliament elections so much so that by 2003 Pakistanis 
in Scotland were over twice as likely as the average Scot to vote 
for the Scottish National Party. 
No doubt they were responding to the SN P's line on the Iraq 
war, which the SNP opposed at the 2003 Scottish Parliament 
election (and intend to make the centre-piece of their campaign 
for the 2004 Euro-election). Various Muslim groups, including 
the Lothian Muslim Voting Committeeand the Muslim 
Association of Britain called upon Muslims to switch to the SNP 
in 2003; and the SNP had long ago set up an affiliated organisa­
tion 'Asians for Independence.' The Nationalist welcoming com­
mittee already existed: all it needed was an event that could 
loosen Asians' traditional ties to Labour. 
But whatever the reason, the significant point is that this 
racially and culturally distinctive minority is not alienated from 
the party of Scottish nationalism (small 'n' or large 'N') but actu­
ally far more favourable to it than the average Scot! Setting aside 
the BNP (the extreme right-wing British National Party which is 
far too easy a target), it is almost inconceivable that any English 
National Party, however moderate, could win twice as much 
support from Blacks and Asians as from the average voter in 
England. 
But are Scottish Muslims right? Is Scotland really a rela­
tively safe haven? 
Scottish Muslims are clearly attached to the inherently plau­
sible view that Scotland is a relatively safe haven - even in com­
parison with neighbouring England. But they might nonetheless 
be wrong: it might be merely an outsider's perspective. Perhaps 
England and the English are not so bad as they look from the out­
side. One test is to look at the perceptions of the majorities in 
England and Scotland. How do they rate the level of conflict with 
their own Muslim minorities? 
We use a tight definition of 'majorities' in England and 
Scotland. Not surprisingly lslamophobia (and in Scotland 
Anglophobia also) is lower amongst the minorities than amongst 
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the titular majorities, and it would be misleading to include the 
views of the minorities themselves in our calculations of anti­
mi nority-phobias. 
We define 'majority England' or the 'majority English' as 
'White,' non-Muslims, living in England. And 'majority Scotland' 
or 'majority Scots' even more tightly as 'White', non-Muslims, 
born in Scotland, with Scottish-born partners (if any). It is impor­
tant to exclude English immigrants in Scotland because they are 
(proportionately) so numerous and so distinctive. It is unneces­
sary to exclude Scottish immigrants in England because they are 
neither (proportionately) numerous nor distinctive. This asymme­
try is a consequence of the fact that the population of England is 
ten times that of Scotland. 
The perceptions of 'majority Scots' and 'majority English' 
suggest that conflict with Muslims is indeed much greater in 
England than in Scotland. Only 42 percent of majority Scots 
think Muslim/non-Muslim conflict is at least 'fairly serious' in 
Scotland. But 61 percent of the majority English think 
Muslim/non-Muslim conflict in England is at least 'fairly serious.' 
That suggests Scottish Muslims are indeed correct in their view 
that Scotland is a relatively safe haven. A significantly greater 
number of the English feel in conflict with Muslims. 
Why is Scotland a relatively safe haven? Better Muslims 
or better Scots? 
It does not take two to make a conflict however. One is 
enough. Perhaps conflict with Muslims is greater in England 
because Muslims themselves are different there. The numbers are 
different. There are more Muslims in England - though still only 
three percent. Or perhaps Muslims in England are socially dif­
ferent. One Muslim participant in a Scottish focus group claimed 
that 'Asian people in Scotland are more productive than Asian 
people living in England. You get a lot of Asians in England that 
are uneducated, unemployed and involved in crime. In Scotland 
Asian people make something of themselves, in England maybe 
not'[PK6-E]. Or perhaps Muslims in England lead more segregat­
ed lives. The same focus-group participant continued: 'In 
Oldham [England] there were riots. One side of the town is total­
ly White while the other side is totally Asian. The Asians there [in 
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Oldham] are the scum of the earth ... nothing to do but watch tel­
evision all day, so they are out causing riots' [PK6-E]. And anoth­
er agreed more diplomatically: 'It is better to live in a mixed area 
than to be segregated' [PK6-G]. 
But another possibility is that conflict is greater in England 
because the English are different from the Scots. If the people of 
England are more lslamophobic than the Scots then Scottish 
Muslims' perception of Scotland as a relatively safe-haven would 
owe something to Scotland and to majority Scots, irrespective of 
any differences between Muslims themselves. We can test that 
directly. We use five strictly comparable indicators of 
lslamophobia in England and Scotland: 
Ml: feeling that Muslims 'take jobs, housing and health 
care from other people in Britain/Scotland' 
M2: feeling that Muslims 'could never be really com­
mitted to Britain/Scotland' 
M3: feeling that Muslims 'are more loyal to other 
Muslims around the world' than they are to 'other peo­
ple in this country' 
M4: feeling that 'England/Scotland would begin to lose 
its identity' if more Muslims came to live in 
England/Scotland' 
MS: saying they 'would feel unhappy if a close relative 
married or formed a long-term relationship with a 
Muslim' 
Following familiar English usage, some of these questions in 
England use the term 'Britain' instead of 'England.' In Scotland 
they use the term 'Scotland' without exception. These five ques­
tions provide a comparative index of lslamophobia in England 
and Scotland. 
In addition within Scotland we repeated these five questions 
but re-wording them to focus on English immigrants rather than 
Muslims: 
El: feeling that English immigrants 'take jobs, housing 
and health care from other people in Scotland' 
E2: feeling that English immigrants 'could never be real­
ly committed to Scotland' 
E3: feeling that the English immigrants 'are more loyal 
to England' than they are to Scotland 
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E4: feeling that 'Scotland would begin to lose its identi­
ty' if more English immigrants came to live in Scotland 
ES: saying they 'would feel unhappy if a close relative 
married or formed a long-term relationship with an 
English person now living in Scotland' 
These five questions provide a strictly comparative index of 
lslamophobia and Anglophobia within Scotland. 
Beyond that we have one indicator that applies only to 
Muslims: M6: feeling that 'Muslims living in Britain have not 
done a great deal to condemn Islamic terrorism' And there are 
indicators of anti-minority-phobia that do not specify either 
Muslims or English immigrants explicitly, though some may 
apply more to one than the other: 
P1: feel that 'to be truly British you have to have been 
born in Britain' 
P2: feel that 'to be truly English/Scottish you have to 
have been born in England/Scotland' 
P3: feel that 'to be truly British you have to be White -
rather than Black or Asian' 
P4: feel that 'to be truly English/Scottish you have to be 
White - rather than Black or Asian' 
Large numbers insist that birthplace is an important criteri­
on for nationality and relatively few stress race. But there is no 
significant difference between Scotland and England in the 
extent to which the majority feel it is necessary to be born in the 
country in order to be 'truly' British, 'truly' Scottish, or 'truly' 
English, and only a small difference between Scotland and 
England in the extent to which the majority feel it is necessary to 
be White in order to be 'truly' British, Scottish or English. In these 
respects attitudes in England are only very slightly more racist 
than in Scotland if at all. 
But very consistently across a whole range of issues from 
economic resentment and nationalist distrust to fears of threats to 
national identity and especially social exclusion, lslamophobia 
is greater in England than in Scotland. We should not overstate 
the extent of lslamophobia. Our more detailed SSAS data show 
that majority Scots overwhelmingly support cultural variety. They 
overwhelmingly support laws to ban discrimination against 
Muslims (race discrimination has long been illegal in Britain, but 
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religious discrimination has not), and they are sensitive to the 
lack of any Muslim or Asian MSPs in the Scottish Parliament. 
Nonetheless around a third of majority Scots feel some econom­
ic resentment towards Muslims and express socially exclusive 
attitudes towards them. Many feel Scotland would begin to lose 
its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland. Many doubt 
Muslims' commitment to Scotland. And most Scots feel Muslims' 
first loyalty lies outside Scotland. 
On most but not all of these points majority Scots are rather 
more lslamophobic than Anglophobic though most of them 
doubt the loyalty 'to Scotland' of both the Muslims and English 
immigrants. And while almost a fifth of majority Scots feel a per­
son has to be 'White' to be a 'true Scot,' two-thirds feel they 
would have to be born in Scotland (implicitly excluding the 
English immigrants but not the Scots-born Muslims). In the event 
of independence one third would withhold Scottish passports 
from those they felt were not 'true Scots.' 
So without overstating the degree or intensity of 
lslamophobia or Anglophobia in Scotland, we have clear evi­
dence that both phobias exist. We also have clear evidence that 
lslamophobia is greater in England than in Scotland. 
Excluding those with no opinion or mixed opinions, an 
average of 63 percent of the majority in England agree with Ml-
5 (i.e. lslamophobia in England= 63%). By contrast only an aver­
age of 49 percent of majority Scots agree with M 1-5 (i.e. 
lslamophobia in Scotland = 49%). An average of 38 percent of 
majority Scots agree with El -5 (i.e. Anglophobia in Scotland = 
38%). So on strictly comparable indicators lslamophobia in 
England runs 14 percent ahead of lslamophobia in Scotland, and 
as a measure of its political significance we note that this differ­
ence is greater than the difference between lslamophobia and 
Anglophobia within Scotland. 
Only five percent of Scots would be unhappy if a close rel­
ative 'married or formed a long term relationship' with an English 
immigrant, but 32 percent of majority Scots and 52 percent of 
the majority in England would be unhappy if a close relative 
'married or formed a long term relationship' with a Muslim. 
So very few feel socially exclusive towards the English, but a 
third of Scots and half the English feel socially exclusive towards 
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fable 2: Impact on phobias of knowledge about Muslims 
at least not very nothing at impac 
quite a lot much all 
% % % 
Anglophobia: average E l-5 33 35 47 14 
Jslamophobia: average M 1-5 41 (51] 44 (60] 66 (78] 24 [27 
Muslims not condemn terror 46 (59] 55 (62] 64 (73] 18 [14 
'o be 'truly' British/ English/ Scottish must be: 
... born in Britain 58 [53] 64 (63] 78 (81] 20 [28 
... born in Scotland/England 55 [50] 61 (62] 77 (78] 22 [28 
White (to be British) 13 (17] 12 (15] 24 (36] 11 {JI; 
White (to be Scottish/English) 12 (18] 14 (20] 31 (38] 19 {2(j 
fotes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside [ ] are for England. 
>K's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages. Source: SSAS/BSAS 2003. 
Muslims. The difference, however, between Scots and English 
attitudes towards Muslims is striking, and any suspicions that 
answers to this question are affected by political correctness can­
not explain why the responses are so very different in Scotland 
and England. Indeed the intensity of happiness and unhappiness 
varies between Scotland and England: 26 percent of majority 
Scots but only half as many majority English go far beyond polit­
ical correctness and claim they would actually be 'very happy' 
to have a Muslim relative. 
By common agreement, whether viewed from inside or out­
side England, there is more perceived Muslim/non-Muslim con­
flict in England, and that is linked, whether as cause or effect or 
both, to greater lslamophobia in England. 
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How strong is the connection between lslamophobia and 
sub-state nationalism? 
The usual explanation of racist or ethnic phobias is simply 
'small-mindedness,' parochialism rather than cosmopolitanism, 
brought on by living a physically, intellectually, or emotionally 
restricted life. 
Social background can affect parochialism. Lack of educa­
tion, especially lack of higher education, is a key variable under­
lying parochialism. Generation rather than age itself also could 
be significant since the development of mass media and cheap 
mass transport have globalised the world of the average person 
to an unprecedented degree. Globalisation may have eroded dif­
ferences between the educated and uneducated even as (higher) 
education itself has become more widespread. By contrast glob­
alisation may intensify class divisions: the working class operat­
ing in a relatively local employment market and engaged in rel­
atively routine activities are not only likely to have restricted 
parochial outlooks but are more exposed to economic competi­
tion from immigrants and incomers whether these come from 
other cultures or not. Gender plays a potentially significant but 
ambiguous role since women have traditionally (but perhaps no 
longer) had more parochial perspectives yet at the same time a 
more sympathetic outlook. 
Both Scotland and England have National Churches 
'Established' by law, the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland and 
the (Episcopalian) Church of England. Their connection with the 
state is now relatively weak and indeed obscure but they remain, 
to some of their adherents at least, an expression of the nation. 
In both countries the public divides into only three large reli­
gious groups (plus many much smaller ones): the National 
Church ('C of S,' or 'C of E'), Catholics, and most numerous of 
all, the irreligious. It seems reasonable to ask whether adherents 
of the national church take a distinctive view of Muslims (and 
within Scotland, of English immigrants also). 
But whatever its social foundations, parochial nationalism 
goes naturally with racist and ethnic phobias. 'Multicultural 
nationalism' is an oxymoron. Despite the conscious efforts of 
political elites in Scotland including the leaders of the SNP 
(Scottish National Party) there is an inescapable tension between 
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nationalism and multiculturalism and a historic tendency for 
them to prove incompatible. Pulzer argues that nationalism is 
often 'inspired ... by the urge to emancipate' but that its 'logical 
conclusion' is very different: 'a paroxysm of destructiveness.' The 
genuinely inclusive 'civic' nationalism of the Scottish political 
elite may not apply down 'at street level.' And in England there 
are no equivalent 'civic' English nationalists, no leaders of an 
English National Party with a multiculturalist agenda. So in 
England the natural connection between parochial nationalism 
and anti-minority-phobias is not consciously restrained by a 
'civic' nationalist political elite. It seems essential therefore to 
investigate the connection between 'street-level' nationalism and 
racial or ethnic phobias and with the expectation that the con­
nection will prove stronger in England than in Scotland. 
Tabulating the attitudes of majorities towards minorities by 
personal contacts and knowledge, class, education, age and gen­
eration, gender, religion, nationalism, and partisanship suggests 
that education is more important than class, that gender and reli­
gious sect (Established 'national' church versus Catholics) have 
no impact, and that the impact of religiosity merely reflects the 
generational decline in religiosity a generational rather than truly 
religous impact. So we focus on just five key factors: (i) contacts 
and knowledge, (ii) age and generation, (iii) education, (iv) 
national identity, and (v) partisanship or 'political nationalism.' 
The impact of contacts and knowledge 
Compared to those who say they know at least 'quite a lot' 
about Muslims, those who say they 'know nothing at all' are 
around 25 percent more lslamophobic (24 percent more in 
Scotland and 27 percent more in England). In Scotland, the 
'know nothings' are also 14 percent more Anglophobic as well. 
The 'know nothings' are also around 16 percent more likely to 
criticise Muslims for not sufficiently condemning terrorism, 
around 20 percent more likely to cite being 'White' as a neces­
sary condition for being 'truly' English or Scottish, and up to 28 
percent more likely to cite being born in the country as a neces­
sary condition for being 'truly' English or British (rather less so in 
Scotland however). 
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Table 2: Im.pact on phob.i� of knowledge about MusJ.im.i 
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The impact of age and generation 
Age and generation have a significant impact on 
lslamophobia in both England and Scotland (though very little 
impact on Anglophobia in Scotland). On both sides of the bor­
der our composite measure of lslamophobia varies by 20 percent 
across the age cohorts though age has more impact on simple 
racial acceptance in England than in Scotland, and on both sides 
of the border there is evidence of a sharp generational shift at 
about age 55, rather than a progressive impact of steadily 
increasing age. 
By margins of 29 percent in England and 21 percent in 
Scotland, the old are more apprehensive than the young that 
Britain (or Scotland) would begin to lose its identity if there were 
an influx of Muslims. By margins of 30 percent in England and 
24 percent in Scotland the old are more likely to feel that to be 
93 
Ethnic Studies Review Volume 27: 1 
'truly English (or Scottish)' a person must be White. By smaller 
margins of 23 percent in England and only 14 percent in 
Scotland, the old are more likely to feel that to be 'truly British' 
a person must be White - 'rather than Black or Asian'. And by 
huge margins of 55 percent in England and 48 percent in 
Scotland the old are more unhappy than the young at the thought 
of having a Muslim relative. 
In Scotland all these indicators reveal a 'step effect' at 
around age 55 - a generational shift rather than a progressive age 
effect. And the same is true in England except on the question 
about a Muslim relative. 
The impact of education 
Comparing university graduates with those who have no 
educational qua I ifications it seems that education has more 
impact on lslamophobia (and on Anglophobia) than almost any­
thing else. 
From graduates down through levels of school qualifications 
lslamophobia (and Anglophobia) increase steadily. So by mar-
Table 3: Impact on phobias of Age & Generation 
to 34 45-44 45-54 55-64 
% % % % 
Anglophobia: average EI-5 35 39 37 39 
lslamophobia: average MI-5 42 [56] 46 [59] 45 [58] 55 [64) 
Muslims not condemn terror 55 [63] 62 [69) 51 [57) 55 [57) 
To be 'truly' British / English / Scottish must be: 
... born in Britain 59 [64) 70 [60) 59 [61) 71 [67) 
... born in Scotland/England 59 [62] 65 [59) 60 [57) 70 [69) 
White (to be British) IO [12] 16 [12) 12 [16) 17 [24] 
White (to be Scottish/English) 12 [14] 14 [17] 14 [14) 22 [27] 
Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside [] are for England. 
DK's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages. Source: SSAS/BSAS 2003. 
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gins of 49 percent in England and 34 percent in Scotland those 
without qualifications are more lslamophobic than graduates. In 
Scotland they are also 25 percent more Anglophobic. 
The pattern is very consistent but not quite monotonic: those 
with 'higher education below degree level' are slightly more 
lslamophobic (and Anglophobic) than those with the highest 
level of school qualifications. 
Similarly, by margins ranging from 27 percent to 46 percent 
in England, and from 19 percent to 36 percent in Scotland, those 
without qualifications are more likely than graduates to cite race 
or birthplace as a necessary condition for being truly 
English/Scottish or British. 
Only newspaper choice (closely linked in Britain to educa­
tion) has a greater apparent impact on lslamophobia, and there 
the causal direction is ambiguous. English readers of the high-
Table 4: Impact o:n phobfa� ofEduc:atio:n 
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Table 5: Impact on phobias of National Identity 
Anglophobia: average E 1-5 
lslamophobia: average Ml -5 
Muslims not condemn terror 
Exel 
Brit 
#1 
% 
More Equally More Exel 
Brit E/S & Brit Engl/Scot Engl/Scot 
#2 #3 #4 #5 
% % % % 
na na 33 35 46 
na [50) na [65) 50 (58) 46 (61) 54 (78) 
na [52) na [69) 53 (58) 49 (62) 65 (72) 
To be 'truly' British / English / Scottish must be: 
... born in Britain 
... born in Scotland/England 
White (to be British) 
White (to be Scottish/English) 
na [53) na [55) 
na (49) na (60) 
na [ 9) na [ 17) 
na (14) na (22) 
62 [64) 
57 (57) 
16 (11) 
17 (14) 
Notes: % outside brackets arc for Scotland; % inside [ ) arc for England. 
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65 (67) 
14(21) 
19 (24) 
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18 [38) 
21 [44) 
OK's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages. Source: SSAS/BSAS 2003. 
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The impact of sub-state national identities 
One measure of national identity is provided by answers to the 
'Moreno' question: 
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Which, if any, of the following best describes how you 
see yourself? 
English/Scottish not British 
More English/Scottish than British 
Equally English/Scottish and British 
More British than English/Scottish 
British not English/Scottish 
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(The term 'English' is used for interviews within 
England, 
the term 'Scottish' for interviews within Scotland.) 
In the 1980s the Moreno scale was originally conceived as 
a 5-point symmetric scale. But by 2003 only a quarter of major­
ity English and less than three percent of majority Scots identified 
more with Britain than with England/Scotland. Identification 
'more with Britain' was much more popular amongst the bulk of 
the minorities - including English immigrants in Scotland as well 
as Blacks and Asians in England (though Asians in Scotland iden­
tify very strongly with Scotland, not with Britain). The conse­
quence is that the numbers in categories 4 and 5 (more British or 
exclusively British) are now too small to provide a basis for any 
analysis in Scotland and must be used with care even in England. 
Nearly all majority Scots and most majority English are spread 
across an effectively 3-point scale running from 'exclusively' 
English/Scottish through to 'equally British and English/Scottish' 
- that is on a scale that (effectively) runs from 'exclusive' to 'dual' 
identities. 
Compared to dual identifiers, the exclusively English are 20 
percent more lslamophobic. But the exclusively Scottish are only 
a negligible four percent more lslamophobic. Indeed exclusive 
national identity as measured by the Moreno scale of national 
identity makes people in Scotland more Anglophobic (by 13 per­
cent) rather than more lslamophobic (a mere four percent). 
Furthermore, the majority English (unlike majority Scots) do 
spread themselves all the way across the full 5-point scale. So 
arguably the proper measure of the impact of parochial nation­
alism on lslamophobia in England is 28 percent rather than 20 
percent- the difference between the exclusively English and the 
exclusively British in England, rather than between the exclu­
sively English and those who are equally British and English. But 
by any measure parochial nationalism has a significant impact 
on lslamophobia in England - yet not in Scotland. 
The contrast between the impact of parochial nationalism in 
England and Scotland is perhaps even greater when we assess its 
impact on citing race as a necessary condition for being truly 
English/Scottish or British. Compared to those who identify 
equally with Britain and England/Scotland, the exclusively 
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English are 27-30 percent more likely to cite race (being 'White 
rather than Black or Asian') as a necessary condition for being 
'truly British' or 'truly English'. In Scotland the exclusively 
Scottish are scarcely any more likely (only two to four percent) 
than those who identify equally with Britain and Scotland to cite 
race as a necessary condition for being 'truly British' or 'truly 
Scottish.' 
Although its impact is not great, such as it is the impact of 
Scottish nationalism in complete contrast to English nationalism 
seems almost irrelevant to lslamophobia. Instead it is specifical­
ly Anglophobic, focused on the 'Auld Enemy,' the 'significant 
other' that helps to define Scottish identity, rather than on 
minorities that differ far more in terms of race, religion or culture 
from majority Scots. 
Political nationalism: the impact of partisanship 
Political nationalism, especially support for the SNP 
(Scottish National Party) can be measured by voting behaviour. 
We use the voting choices (and abstention) of majority English 
and majority Scots at the 2001 General Election. The only parties 
that had enough voters to provide a basis for analysis in England 
and Scotland are the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal­
Democrat parties plus, in Scotland only, the SNP. (The extreme 
racist BNP, British National Party, won considerable publicity in 
England but very few votes.) 
Taking the seven parties separately (e.g. distinguishing 
Conservative voters in Scotland from those in England) the level 
of lslamophobia is lowest of all amongst Scottish Liberal­
Democrats (27 percent), and highest of all amongst English 
Conservatives (67 percent). They differ by a full 40 percent on 
lslamophobia. 
Within each country, both lslamophobia and Anglophobia 
are lowest amongst Liberal-Democrats. But while Anglophobia is 
highest amongst SNP voters, lslamophobia is highest amongst 
Conservatives - both in England and also in Scotland. 
Non-voters come a close second to SNP voters on Anglophobia 
in Scotland, and a close second to Conservatives on 
lslamophobia both in England and in Scotland. 
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Conclusions 
In England there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that 
racial and cultural minorities identify with supposedly-inclusive 
'Britain' rather than supposedly-exclusive 'England.' And con­
versely that exclusively English nationalists, those members of 
the White majority who describe themselves as 'English, not 
British', are particularly antagonistic towards racial and cultural 
minorities. If race, culture, and identity were linked together in a 
similar way within Scotland, we might expect that the position of 
any racially and culturally distinctive minority might have been 
undermined by the growth of Scottish nationalism even without 
the shock of Sept 11th But paradoxically we have shown that in 
almost every particular the opposite is the case. Our research 
shows that Muslims in Scotland identify with 'Scotland' rather 
than 'Britain' and the 'War on Terror' has committed Muslims far 
more strongly to Scotland than ever before. 
It is a rational response. Despite or more probably because 
of the growth of Scottish national identity and the advent of a 
separate Scottish Parliament, lslamophobia is significantly lower 
in Scotland than in England. 
Insofar as Scottish nationalism has an impact on ethnic-pho­
bias, it has more impact on Anglophobia than on lslamophobia. 
So lslamophobia is not only significantly greater in England than 
in Scotland, it is also much more closely tied to English nation­
alism within England, than to Scottish nationalism within 
Scotland. That reflects the tendency of Scots to define themselves 
negatively as 'not-English' and to define the English as their 'Auld 
Enemy.' More important, it implies that English nationalism is 
more 'ethnic' while Scottish nationalism is more 'civic'. 
There are other factors, notably age and education, that 
have more impact than nationalism on lslamophobia. We have 
focused on the impact of nationalism not because it is so great 
but because, especially in Scotland, it is so very weak. Like 
Sherlock Holmes, we have focused on the importance of 'the 
dog that did not bark', or as Peter Pulzer might say, 'the tiger that 
did not snarl.' The impacts of age and education are large but not 
unexpected, while the impact of nationalism in Scotland is unex­
pectedly small or even, by some criteria, the reverse of expecta­
tions. 
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That reflects the consistently multi-cultural strategy of 
Scottish political elites - including the devolutionists of Scottish 
Labour, the federalists of Scottish Liberal Democrats, and espe­
cially the independence-oriented leadership of the SNP (Scottish 
National Party) who were determined that Scottish government­
and Scottish people should not only be more independent but 
more virtuous. They were minded to replace Gandhi's claim: 
'Good government is no substitute for self-government' with its 
inverse: 'self-government is no substitute for good government' 
and add 'nor an excuse for self-indulgent citizens.' Hence SNP 
leader John Swinney's claim (cited above) that 'racism' is a 
'national shame' or a 'national disgrace' , a claim echoed in one 
of our Muslim focus-groups by the participant who asserted '90 
percent of the people here are nice but the other ten percent are 
racist which is a shame for the image of Scotland'[PK3-D]. For 
these high-minded liberal elites, independence meant responsi­
bility rather than freedom. 
The Scottish public is not so naturally multi-culturalist as 
Scottish elites. We have evidence of a very slight tendency for the 
exclusively Scottish to be just a tad more lslamophobic as well 
as significantly more Anglophobic. But Scottish elites, critically 
including Scottish Nationalist elites, work harder to moderate 
public prejudice than do English elites, even English mainstream 
elites that make no claim to represent English nationalism. The 
Scottish Nationalist elite's multiculturalism does not reach down 
to the street, but it has sufficient influence on the street to con­
trol and moderate the street-level antipathy between Muslims 
and nationalists, of the kind that exists within England. 
Consequently Muslims in Scotland are not mistaken when 
they conclude that Scotland, for all its acknowledged faults, its 
prejudice and its harassment of Muslims, is nonetheless a rela­
tively safe-haven in a very dangerous world, the best place for 
them to be in the aftermath of Sept 11th. 
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